Inferring the direction of implied motion depends on visual awareness by Faivre, Nathan & Koch, Christof
Inferring the direction of implied motion depends on visual
awareness
Nathan Faivre # $
Computation and Neural Systems, California Institute of
Technology, Pasadena, CA, USA
Christof Koch # $
Computation and Neural Systems, California Institute of
Technology, Pasadena, CA, USA
Allen Institute for Brain Science, Seattle, WA, USA
Visual awareness of an event, object, or scene is, by
essence, an integrated experience, whereby different
visual features composing an object (e.g., orientation,
color, shape) appear as an unified percept and are
processed as a whole. Here, we tested in human
observers whether perceptual integration of static
motion cues depends on awareness by measuring the
capacity to infer the direction of motion implied by a
static visible or invisible image under continuous flash
suppression. Using measures of directional adaptation,
we found that visible but not invisible implied motion
adaptors biased the perception of real motion probes. In
a control experiment, we found that invisible adaptors
implying motion primed the perception of subsequent
probes when they were identical (i.e., repetition
priming), but not when they only shared the same
direction (i.e., direction priming). Furthermore, using a
model of visual processing, we argue that repetition
priming effects are likely to arise as early as in the
primary visual cortex. We conclude that although
invisible images implying motion undergo some form of
nonconscious processing, visual awareness is necessary
to make inferences about motion direction.
Introduction
The visual system constantly draws indirect infer-
ences about properties that are not explicitly deﬁned in
terms of physical signals. A striking example is our
capacity to infer motion features from static pictures
implying movement (e.g., an athlete running rightward,
see Freyd, 1983). This capacity involves the analysis of
static cues such as ﬁgure-ground segregation (Roelfse-
ma, Lamme, Spekreijse, & Bosch, 2002), motion
streaks (Burr & Ross, 2002; Geisler, 1999), body
posture (Jellema & Perrett, 2003), and their integration
within the context of the scene. Although such stimuli
do not carry explicit motion information (i.e., there is
no continuous variation of luminance over time), they
are known to activate brain areas involved during real
motion processing such as MT/V5 (Kourtzi & Kan-
wisher, 2000; Lorteije et al., 2006; Peuskens, Vanrie,
Verfaillie, & Orban, 2005; Senior et al., 2000; Williams
& Wright, 2009; but see Lorteije et al., 2011, for
potential low-level confounds). Furthermore, exposure
to implied motion adaptors is known to induce
repulsory shifts in the perceived position of subsequent
static probes (Pavan, Cuturi, Maniglia, Casco, &
Campana, 2011) and in the perceived direction of
subsequent real-motion probes (Winawer, Huk, &
Boroditsky, 2008). Such a shift in the perception of
motion direction (i.e., directional adaptation) is sup-
posed to result from a decrease in the responsiveness of
directionally selective neurons coding for real motion
(Barlow & Hill, 1963). Thus, it has been proposed that
the same subset of neurons encode both implied and
real motion information. Interestingly, it is known that
motion information is encoded even when rendered
invisible by binocular rivalry (Wiesenfelder & Blake,
1991), continuous ﬂash suppression (Kaunitz, Fracas-
so, & Melcher, 2011; Maruya, Watanabe, & Watanabe,
2008), or crowding (Aghdaee, 2005; Faivre, Berthet, &
Kouider, 2012; Rajimehr, Vaziri-Pashkam, Afraz, &
Esteky, 2004; Whitney, 2005). These results suggest
that one can infer the direction of real motion even
though it is not accessible to awareness. Here, we aimed
at testing whether a similar inference can be made
regarding the direction of implied motion.
Much more processing is required to infer the
direction of implied motion than of real motion, since
the former involves the encoding of complex features
and their integration into one uniﬁed perceptual
representation, while the latter simply involves the
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detection of luminance (or contrast, in case of second
order motion) changes over time. Considering the
complexity of the features deﬁning the direction of
implied motion, we tested whether they could induce
directional adaptation when rendered invisible by
continuous ﬂash suppression.
The integration of different physical features into
one uniﬁed perceptual representation is commonly
considered to depend on conscious processes (Baars,
2005; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene & Nac-
cache, 2001). Accordingly, it has been proposed that
visual awareness intrinsically relates to the capacity of
the brain to integrate different aspects of incoming
signals into a uniﬁed percept (Tononi, 2008). By
contrast, integrative capacities are not held to be as
potent for signals that are not accessed consciously.
Building upon these assumptions, Koch and Tononi
(2011) proposed that a system able to process the
intricate elements of a complex visual scene as a whole
may be considered as conscious. Recently, this tentative
operational test for visual awareness has been chal-
lenged by two studies suggesting that semantic relations
between an object and its background can be processed
in the absence of awareness (Mudrik, Breska, Lamy, &
Deouell, 2011; Mudrik & Koch, 2013). Here, we further
investigated the relevance of this test for visual
awareness by measuring whether human observers




Healthy paid volunteers with normal or corrected-
to-normal visual acuity were recruited from the
California Institute of Technology student population
(age range: 18–30). Five participants were included in
Experiment 1, 15 in Experiment 2 (divided to three
equal groups assigned to Experiments 2a, b, c), and 21
in Experiment 3 (10 in Experiment 3a, 11 in Experiment
3b). Subjects were naı¨ve to the purpose of these
experiments and gave informed written consent. All
experiments conformed to institutional guidelines for
experiments with human participants and to the
Declaration of Helsinki.
Apparatus
Stimuli were presented using Matlab and the
Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).
Participants’ heads were stabilized using a chinrest
located 57 cm away from a 19-in. CRT screen
(resolution 1024 · 768; refresh rate 100 Hz). A mirror
stereoscope was used to present images separately to
each eye.
Stimuli
Stimuli were derived from the ones used by Winawer
et al. (2008). They consisted of 80 pictures of people,
animals, or vehicles moving leftward or rightward. All
of them were equated in terms of luminance histogram
and spatial frequency using the SHINE toolbox
(Willenbockel et al., 2010).
Continuous flash suppression
A frame (9.98 · 9.98) composed of textured black
and white bars (0.68 width) was presented to each eye
against a gray background (6.15 cd.m2) to facilitate
stable binocular fusion. Trials were self-paced and
started after participants indicated that a ﬁxation dot
presented to the dominant eye (0.28 diameter) was
centered within a circle presented to the nondominant
eye (1.28 diameter). Continuous ﬂash suppression
(CFS) patterns consisted of arrays of 600 randomly
generated disks (diameters from 0.18 to 1.28) of
different shades of gray. They were ﬂashed at an
effective frame rate of 10 Hz to the dominant eye.
Procedure for Experiment 1
Experiment 1 measured directional adaptation from
visible implied motion stimuli. The experiment was
divided into six blocks of 24 trials and lasted around 1
hr. On each trial, while the dominant eye received a
static homogeneous gray background, the nondomi-
nant eye was presented with a sequence of adaptors
(i.e., implied motion pictures; 9.38 · 9.38) during 20 s in
the ﬁrst trial of each block or 6 s in other trials (i.e.,
top-up adaptation procedure). Each adaptor was
presented for 500 ms with no interstimulus interval
(ISI), so that a sequence contained either 40 adaptors
(ﬁrst trial of each block) or 12 adaptors (other trials),
with no repetition within a sequence. The direction of
implied motion was constant within a block. The
sequence of adaptors was followed by a probe
presented for 1 s, consisting of a set of 100 dots
randomly distributed within a 9.38 · 9.38 area (dot
diameter ¼ 0.18, Michelson contrast ¼ 0.23). On each
frame, a fraction of dots was translated horizontally
towards the right or the left, with a speed of 10.38.s1
(i.e., real motion). A new set of dots was reselected for
coherent motion on each frame, so that the trajectory
of single dots could not be followed over the probe’s
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duration. All other dots disappeared and randomly
reappeared at any other location within the test
window. The proportion of moving dots deﬁned
motion coherence from 0% to 100% in each direction.
Three levels of motion coherence were selected for each
subject, based on a motion sensitivity measure preced-
ing the experiment (see below). Motion coherence and
motion direction changed randomly from trial to trial.
Participants were instructed to indicate the motion
direction as accurately as possible using the left or right
arrow of the keyboard, with no constraint on reaction
time. Finally, using the same keys, they had to guess
whether the adaptors implied leftward or rightward
motion (objective visibility measure).
Motion sensitivity measure
Prior to the adaptation phase of Experiments 1 and
2, the motion sensitivity of each participant was
measured, using the random-dot display described
above with motion coherence ranging from 5% to 65%.
The maximal motion coherence for a participant was
deﬁned as the average of the absolute coherence values
that gave rise to asymptotic performance (e.g., 99% and
1% of trials perceived as moving in each direction). In
the adaptation phase, random dots were displayed with
100%, 50%, and 25% of the maximal motion coherence
for each direction, resulting in six different probes.
Deﬁning motion coherence for each participant al-
lowed us to account for subject’s variability in terms of
motion sensitivity and to therefore optimally sample
the psychometric response. Across participants, the
average of the maximal motion coherence in Experi-
ment 1 was 11.6% (SE¼ 1.9%), and no systematic
directional bias was found.
Procedure for Experiment 2a
Experiments 2a and 2b measured directional adap-
tation for invisible implied motion stimuli. The
procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1 except
for the following changes. First, instead of a gray
background, the dominant eye received a stream of
CFS patterns, decreasing the visibility of the implied
motion stimulus presented to the nondominant eye (see
Figure 1 and Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). Second, before
the objective visibility task, participants were asked to
report their subjective percept of the adaptor using a
four-alternative forced choice task by indicating
whether they had no perceptual experience of the
implied motion adaptors, a brief glimpse, an almost
clear percept, or a perfectly clear percept (subjective
visibility measure, see Ramsy & Overgaard, 2004). The
use of objective and subjective visibility measures
allowed for a reliable estimation of awareness at the
single trial level (see below). Across participants, the
average of the maximal motion coherence was 17.6%
(SE ¼ 5.0).
Procedure for Experiment 2b
The procedure was identical to the procedure of
Experiment 2a, except that the direction of adaptors
changed randomly within a block, and all adaptors
were presented for 6 s. Across participants, the average
of the maximal motion coherence was 11.7% (SE¼2.4).
Procedure for Experiment 2c
Experiment 2c measured directional adaptation for
invisible directional arrows. The procedure was identi-
cal to the invisible condition in Experiment 2b, except
that the implied motion adaptors were replaced by 48 ·
48 directional arrows (. or,). Edges of the arrow were
blurred by blurring the image with a Gaussian ﬁlter (r
¼ 0.0558). In order to prevent the arrow from breaking
CFS, the Michelson contrast was ramped up linearly
from zero to a maximum value of 0.22 during the ﬁrst
500 ms of stimulus display. Across participants, the
average of the maximal motion coherence was 12.0%
(SE ¼ 1.35%).
Procedure for Experiment 3a
Experiment 3a measured repetition priming from
invisible implied motion stimuli. The procedure was
identical to the one of Experiment 2b, except for the
following changes. Rather than a random-dot display,
we used an implied motion picture as a probe, which
could be either identical to the adaptor (congruent
condition) or any picture of the stimulus set implying a
motion of opposite direction (noncongruent condition).
The size of the probe was 7.58 · 7.58, which is 80% of
the size of the adaptor. Participants were instructed to
indicate as fast as possible the motion direction implied
in the probe. Visibility (i.e., presence or absence of
CFS) was manipulated in a within-subject design, with
the invisible condition always preceding the visible
condition.
Procedure for Experiment 3b
Experiment 3b measured direction priming from
invisible implied motion stimuli. The procedure was
identical to the one of Experiment 3a, except for the
following changes. We randomly split the stimulus set
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into two equal subsets containing 40 stimuli, one for
the adaptors and the other for the probes. Thus, an
adaptor was never seen as a probe throughout the
experiment and vice versa. In the congruent condition,
the adaptor and the probe were different pictures with
the same implied motion direction (e.g., a horse
running leftward followed by a cyclist riding leftward),
while in the incongruent condition, the adaptor and the
probe were different pictures with the opposite implied
motion direction (e.g., a car driving leftward followed
by a man running rightward). Finally, a prime never
appeared as a probe, in order to avoid potential
instances of conscious stimulus-response mapping
(Damian, 2001).
Data analysis
In Experiments 1 and 2a, b, c, which involved
measures of directional adaptation, the shape of the
psychometric function was derived using a two-
parameter logistic function in which the upper limit was
ﬁxed at one (i.e., for leftward motion at maximal
motion coherence) and the lower limit was constrained
to approach zero (i.e., for rightward motion at maximal
motion coherence).1
The midpoint of the logistic function was used as a
measure for the point of subjective equality (PSE). The
negative slope of the function at the midpoint was
taken as a measure for the discriminability of motion
direction. In the invisible condition of Experiments 2a,
b, c and 3a, b we discarded trials in which performance
on the objective visibility task was beyond 65% in a
given subjective visibility category and a given partic-
ipant. In Experiments 3a and 3b, involving measures of
reaction times (repetition and direction priming re-
spectively), we excluded trials for which the reaction
time on the probe was faster than 300 ms or slower
than 1500 ms (corresponding respectively to 4.4% and
3.9% of total trials) (Whelan, 2010). Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test showed that reaction times averaged
across participants and experimental conditions did not
signiﬁcantly deviate from a normal distribution (Ex-
periment 3a: D ¼ 0.09, p ¼ 0.90; Experiment 3b: D ¼
0.10, p¼ 0.78). Unless speciﬁed, statistic tests were two
sided. Statistical analysis was performed using R (R
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Aus-
tria).
Image analysis
We estimated the physical similarity between adap-
tors and probes in Experiment 3 using a model of early
visual processing (Serre & Riesenhuber, 2004) adapted
from Kietzmann, Swisher, Ko¨nig, and Tong (2012).
First, we mimicked the decrease of spatial resolution
with eccentricity in the visual ﬁeld by a foveation
procedure using the Space Variant Imaging System
Toolbox (Kortum & Geisler, 1996). Stimuli were low-
pass ﬁltered and down sampled in order to produce a
quadratic decrease of spatial resolution with eccentric-
Figure 1. (a) Examples of left and right implied motion stimuli. (b) Experimental procedure for Experiment 2a. While the nondominant
eye was stimulated by the adaptors (here a series of static pictures that implied leftward motion), the dominant eye received a
stream of salient patterns. After 20 s (first trial of each block) or 6 s (other trials) of such display, participants had to report whether
they perceived a random-dot probe as moving rightward or leftward. Subsequently, they were presented with a question asking if
they had no perceptual experience, a brief glimpse, an almost clear image, or a perfectly clear image of the implied motion adaptor
(subjective measure). Finally, they had to indicate the direction of motion implied by the adaptor (objective measure).
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ity (50% resolution at 1.58 of eccentricity from the
center of the stimulus). Then, we ﬁltered the foveated
stimuli with a set of two-dimensional Gabor functions
modeling parafoveal simple cells from monkey primary
visual cortex (Schiller, Finlay, & Volman, 1976). We
used 17 receptive ﬁeld sizes with r ranging from 2.88 to
19.38 and four angular orientations of 0, p/4, p/2, and
3p/4. The output of the model was used to create
correlation matrices reﬂecting low-level similarities
between the adaptors and the probes used in Experi-
ments 3a (repetition priming) and 3b (direction
priming). From Experiment 3a, 40 stimuli implying
leftward motion were analyzed, half of them being
derived from rightward motion stimuli using a hori-
zontal mirror transformation. This resulted in a 40 ·
40 symmetric matrix of cross-correlation coefﬁcients.
Hence, only the low-level similarity between stimuli was
estimated, without any confound with the direction of
implied motion. From Experiment 3b, 20 adaptors
implying leftward motion and 20 adaptors implying
rightward motion were analyzed, in comparison to 20
probes implying leftward motion and 20 probes
implying rightward motion. Hence, we compared the
similarity between adaptors and probes implying the
same versus different motion direction, without any
confound of identity present in Experiment 3a.
Results
Experiment 1 measured directional adaptation for
visible implied motion stimuli. The direction of visible
implied motion adaptors was discriminated with an
accuracy of 98.1% (SE¼ 1.4%), and the motion
direction of random-dot probes (real motion) averaged
over all coherence values was discriminated with an
accuracy of 75.8% (SE¼ 3.8%). Analysis of the
psychometric function revealed that the point of
subjective equality (PSE) for the random-dot probe was
globally shifted towards the left (33% of normalized
motion coherences), revealing a perceptual or response
bias for rightward motion. Surprisingly, this bias is of
relatively large magnitude and was not found when
measuring motion sensitivity prior to the main exper-
iment (see Experimental procedures). This suggests that
it is likely to originate from nonspeciﬁc phenomena
occurring during the procedure, which remain to be
explored (e.g., attentional or training effects, implied
motion default value in all stimuli).
Importantly though, this bias is orthogonal to the
measure of directional adaptation, which is the central
aspect of our study. Accordingly, we found a difference
in PSE after exposure to rightward versus leftward
implied motion (one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test:
PSE shift ¼ 38.8% of motion coherence, W ¼ 0, p¼
0.03, where W denotes the absolute value of the sum of
the signed ranks), revealing a directional adaptation
effect (Figure 2). No difference in terms of motion
discriminability reﬂected by the slope of the psycho-
metric function was found (Wilcoxon signed rank test:
slope difference¼ 1.32, W ¼ 5, p¼ 0.6). These results
replicate the ﬁnding that fully visible implied motion
cues induce directional adaptation effects (Winawer et
al., 2008).
We then tested whether directional adaptation could
be induced by invisible implicit motion inducers. In
Experiment 2a, after sorting trials following both
objective and subjective criteria (see Experimental
procedures and Tables 1, 2), performance on the
objective visibility task fell to 51.9% (SE¼2.0%), which
was not signiﬁcantly different from chance level
(Wilcoxon signed rank test with continuity correction:
W ¼ 9, p ¼ 0.81). As in Experiment 1, the motion
direction of random-dot probes was discriminated far
above chance (74.1%, SE ¼ 2.9%). Also as in
Experiment 1, analysis of the psychometric function
revealed a perceptual bias for rightward motion
(average PSE¼ 19% of normalized coherence). Yet, the
direction of implied motion had no inﬂuence on the
perception of the random-dot probe, nor in terms of
PSE (Wilcoxon signed rank test: PSE shift¼5.1, W¼7,
p¼ 1), nor in terms of discriminability (Wilcoxon
signed rank test: slope difference¼ 0.2, W ¼ 7, p ¼ 1)
(Figure 3a).We conclude that under these conditions,
invisible implied motion stimuli did not elicit a
directional adaptation effect. It is of note that similar
results were obtained when analyses were run exclu-
No experience Brief glimpse Almost clear experience Very clear experience
Exp. 2a 73.1 6 11.3 23.5 6 8.3 3.3 6 0.7 9.2 6 3.7
Exp. 2b 75.5 6 9.6 16.5 6 5.2 8.9 6 5.1 5.2 6 2.9
Exp. 2c 67.6 6 7.11 22.2 6 4.7 8.5 6 3.3 12.7 6 7.5
Exp. 3a visible 1.9 6 0.4 21.6 6 11.4 23.7 6 12.7 78.4 6 11.6
Exp. 3a invisible 71.2 6 8.2 16.2 6 4.8 7.6 6 2.7 11.1 6 5.8
Exp. 3b visible 1.5 6 0.05 12.3 6 6.1 26.7 6 10.8 69.7 6 10.8
Exp. 3b invisible 47.6 6 11.4 26.7 6 6.3 24.3 6 8.0 9.4 6 1.6
Table 1. Average proportion of trials for each category of the subjective perceptual awareness scale 6 SEM. Note that proportion of
trials do not sum up to 100% as not every subject has trials in all four categories.
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sively on trials associated with ‘‘no experience’’ on the
perceptual awareness scale (p values . 0.7). The
absence of directional adaptation from invisible im-
plied motion could have either stemmed from the lack
of implied motion detection in the absence or
awareness or from the use of a block design, in which
the direction of implied motion was constant within a
block of 24 consecutive trials lasting 20 s (ﬁrst trial) or
6 s (other trials). Accordingly, visibility of a stimulus
during a single trial may have inﬂuenced the processing
of stimuli presented in subsequent trials and triggered
the development of strategies we could not control for.
To account for this possibility, we conducted
Experiment 2b, in which the direction of implied
motion was interleaved randomly within a block (see
Experimental procedures). After sorting trials follow-
ing both objective and subjective criteria (see Experi-
mental procedures and Tables 1, 2), performance on
the objective visibility task fell to 53.4% (SE ¼ 3.6%),
which was not signiﬁcantly different from chance
(Wilcoxon signed rank test with continuity correction:
W¼ 11, p¼ 0.42). The motion direction of random-dot
probes was discriminated accurately 77.4% (SE ¼
4.6%). As in Experiment 2a, analysis of the psycho-
metric function revealed a perceptual bias for rightward
motion (average PSE¼ 20% of normalized coherence),
independent of the direction of implied motion
(Wilcoxon signed rank test with continuity correction:
PSE shift ¼ 6.9, W ¼ 5, p ¼ 0.63). No inﬂuence of
implied motion on the discriminability of the random-
dot probe was found (Wilcoxon signed rank test: slope
difference¼ 1.36, W¼ 6, p¼ 0.81) (Figure 3b). It is of
note that similar results were obtained when analyses
were run exclusively on trials associated with ‘‘no
experience’’ on the perceptual awareness scale (p values
. 0.9). Experiment 2b accordingly suggests that
invisible implied motion stimuli did not elicit direc-
tional adaptation.
One explanation for the absence of signiﬁcant results
is that the direction of implied motion cannot be
inferred for invisible adaptors, most likely due to the
complexity of the spatial structure carrying this
information. We therefore designed follow-up Experi-
ment 2c, in which the adaptors consisted of simple
directional arrows. Such stimuli are known to be
processed when rendered invisible with metacontrast
masking (Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, &
Schwarzbach, 2003) and visual crowding (Faivre &
Kouider, 2011a), although to our knowledge no
evidence exists regarding CFS. After sorting trials
following both objective and subjective criteria (see
Experimental procedures and Tables 1, 2), performance
on the objective visibility task fell to 53.0% (SE¼
2.5%), which was not signiﬁcantly different from
chance (Wilcoxon signed rank test with continuity
correction: W ¼ 9, p ¼ 0.20). The motion direction of
random-dot probes was discriminated above chance
78.4% (SE ¼ 4.1%). Here again, analysis of the
psychometric function revealed a perceptual bias for
rightward motion (average PSE ¼ 13% of normalized
coherence) independent from the direction of implied
motion (Wilcoxon signed rank: PSE shift¼ 3.8%, W¼
5, p ¼ 0.63). The discriminability of the random-dot
No experience Brief glimpse Almost clear experience Very clear experience
Exp. 2a 52.7 6 2.0 69.5 6 11.4 100 6 0 100 6 0
Exp. 2b 54.1 6 3.3 58.4 6 11.0 91.7 6 8.3 100 6 0
Exp. 2c 53.1 6 2.5 88.0 6 5.5 100 6 0 100 6 0
Exp. 3a visible 83.3 6 16.7 76.6 6 21.7 98.7 6 1.3 94.9 6 1.6
Exp. 3a invisible 52.7 6 2.1 68.7 6 7.2 97.4 6 2.0 98.2 6 1.1
Exp. 3b visible 100 6 0 95.3 6 2.9 98.2 6 1.7 98.4 6 0.06
Exp. 3b invisible 48.8 6 5.5 61.1 6 6.0 80.2 6 8.2 63.7 6 15.1
Table 2. Average accuracy in percent on the objective visibility task for each category of the perceptual awareness scale 6 SEM. In
the invisible conditions, in order to take into account the variability of accuracy depending on subjective states of perceptual
awareness (e.g., see high SEM in the ‘‘brief glimpse’’ category), we further analyzed trials in which objective accuracy was below 65%
within each category of the perceptual awareness scale.
Figure 2. Experiment 1—Proportion of perceived leftward
motion as a function of motion coherence, after exposure to
leftward (blue) or rightward (red) implied fully visible static
motion adaptors. Percentages indicate normalized motion
coherences, which is the proportion of absolute coherence
values giving rise to asymptotic performance (see Experimental
procedures). Vertical lines stand for the perceptual point of
equality (i.e., a hypothetical probe categorized as moving
leftward with a probability of 0.5). Error bars correspond to the
standard error of the mean (SEM).
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probe did not change according to the direction of
implied motion (Wilcoxon signed rank: slope difference
¼ 4.0, W ¼ 10, p ¼ 0.63) (Figure 3c). It is of note that
similar results were obtained when analyses were run
exclusively on trials associated with ‘‘no experience’’ on
the perceptual awareness scale (p values . 0.4). In
order to examine the possibility that Experiments 2a, b,
c lacked statistical power, we analyzed the psychomet-
ric functions of all participants grouped together.
Despite a triple amount of data points, we did not ﬁnd
a shift in terms of PSE (Wilcoxon signed rank: PSE
shift ¼ 7.0%, W ¼ 46, p ¼ 0.45) nor in terms of
discriminability (Wilcoxon signed rank: slope differ-
ence ¼ 0.9, W ¼ 63, p¼ 0.89) (Figure 3d).
Taken together, Experiments 2a, b, c demonstrate
that static directional stimuli did not elicit a directional
adaptation effect. In the following experiments, we
tested whether implied motion stimuli could be
processed nonconsciously to a lower extent by relying
on measures of priming at two different levels of visual
processing. Priming reﬂects the fact that the processing
of a probe stimulus is more efﬁcient (i.e., typically
faster) when preceded by a related compared to a
nonrelated prime stimulus (Henson, 2003; Schacter,
Dobbins, & Schnyer, 2004). By varying the nature of
the relation between the prime and the probe, we
estimated the level of processing undergone by the
implied motion prime with and without awareness. In
Experiment 3a, a related pair consisted of a prime and a
probe sharing a relation of identity: They depicted the
exact same implied motion picture. In Experiment 3b, a
related pair consisted of a prime and a probe sharing a
relation of directionality: They consisted in different
implied motion images with the same direction of
implied motion. In both experiments, an unrelated pair
consisted of a prime and a probe representing two
distinct implied motion images of opposite direction. In
all cases, the size of the probe was reduced to 80% the
size of the prime in order to decrease low-level
confounds.
In the visible condition of Experiment 3a (repetition
priming), considering that both subjective and objective
reports indicated high visibility for every participants
(see Tables 1, 2), we kept all trials for further analyses.
Figure 3. Proportion of perceived leftward motion as a function of motion coherence, after exposure to invisible leftward (blue) or
rightward (red) adaptors. (a) Implied motion stimuli presented in a block (Experiment 2a) or (b) in a random design (Experiment 2b).
(c) Directional arrow stimuli presented in a random design (Experiment 2c). (d) Data from Experiments 2a, b, c grouped together.
Percentages indicate normalized motion coherences, which is the proportion of absolute coherence values giving rise to asymptotic
performance (see Experimental procedures). Vertical lines stand for the perceptual point of equality (i.e., a hypothetical probe
categorized as moving leftward with a probability of 0.5). Error bars correspond to SEM.
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The direction of the implied motion probe was
discriminated accurately (94.2%, SE¼ 1.9%). Analyses
of reaction times revealed a repetition priming effect,
reﬂecting the fact that observers categorized the
direction of the probe faster when it was preceded by an
identical adaptor compared to an adaptor implying
motion in the opposite direction, paired t test: 86 ms,
t(9)¼ 3.85, p ¼ 0.004 (Figure 4a). In the invisible
condition, after sorting trials following both objective
and subjective criteria (see Experimental procedures
and Tables 1, 2), performance on the objective visibility
task in the invisible condition fell to 54.1% (SE¼2.2%),
which was marginally signiﬁcant, one-sample t test: t(9)
¼ 2.24, p ¼ 0.052. The direction of the implied motion
probe was discriminated accurately (91.0%, SE ¼
1.4%). As in the visible condition, we found a repetition
priming effect, paired t test: 30 ms, t(9)¼ 2.37, p¼
0.042. It remains possible that this priming effect
resulted from residual visibility of the adaptor, as
performance on the objective visibility task was slightly
above chance level. This possibility was undermined by
two aspects of our results. First, the amplitude of
priming did not correlate with visibility, as revealed by
a linear regression analysis (adjusted R2 ¼ 0.097, p¼
0.20). Second, the priming effect was marginally below
signiﬁcance when measured on trials associated with
‘‘no experience’’ on the perceptual awareness scale, t(9)
¼ 2.14, p¼ 0.06. Yet, as it is often reported, the priming
effect in the invisible condition was of lower amplitude
than in the visible condition, paired t test, difference¼
56 ms, t(9)¼ 2.95, p ¼ 0.02.
In the visible condition of Experiment 3b (direction
priming), all trials were included for further analyses
since subjective and objective reports indicated high
visibility in every participants (see Tables 1, 2). The
direction of the implied motion probe was discrimi-
nated accurately (92.5%, SE¼ 1.4%). Analyses of
reaction times revealed no direction priming effect,
paired t test:9 ms, t(10)¼0.86, p¼ 0.41 (Figure 4b).
In the invisible condition, after sorting trials following
both objective and subjective criteria (see Experimental
procedures and Tables 1, 2), performance on the
objective visibility task in the invisible condition fell to
52.5% (SE ¼ 1.6%), which was not signiﬁcantly
different from chance, one sample t test: t(10)¼ 1.53, p
¼ 0.15. The direction of the implied motion probe was
discriminated accurately (92.8%, SE¼ 1.5%). Analyses
of reaction times revealed no direction priming effect,
paired t test: 14 ms, t(10)¼1.29, p¼ 0.23; priming
remained nonsigniﬁcant when measured on trials
associated with ‘‘no experience’’ on the perceptual
awareness scale, with p . 0.6. Furthermore, there was
no difference in terms of high-level priming effect
between the visible and invisible conditions, paired t
test: 5 ms, t(10) ¼0.35, p ¼ 0.73. These results
suggest that irrespective of visibility, an adaptor
implying motion does not speed up the categorization
of a perceptually different probe implying motion in the
same direction. Post-hoc analyses revealed signiﬁcant
differences between the amplitude of repetition (Ex-
periment 3a) and direction priming effects (Experiment
3b), both in the visible, Welch two-sample t test t(18.0)
¼ 2.65, p¼ 0.016, and invisible conditions, Welch two-
sample t test t(12.8) ¼ 3.85, p¼ 0.002. We concluded
from Experiment 3 that weak repetition priming but no
direction priming arises from invisible implied motion
stimuli.
It is usually assumed that size differences between
probes and adaptors are sufﬁcient to rule out potential
low-level origins of repetition priming effects, typically
at the level of the primary visual cortex. However, it is
known that processing in the primary visual cortex (V1)
supports scale-invariant properties (Teichert, Wachtler,
Michler, Gail, & Eckhorn, 2007). We ran a simple, but
physiologically compatible, model of spatial processing
in V1 (Serre & Riesenhuber, 2004) in order to estimate
the similarity within pairs of stimuli sharing a relation
of identity (see Experiment 3a) or directionality (i.e.,
see Experiment 3b) as a function of the size ratio
between the two members of the pair (see Experimental
procedures and Figure 5a). Measures of similarity were
obtained by cross-correlating the output coefﬁcients
provided by the model between the two members of
related versus nonrelated pairs. For identity relations,
we found that the similarity between related pairs
(0.983, SD ¼ 0.036) was signiﬁcantly higher than for
non-related pairs (0.974, SD¼0.0006), t(78)¼15.7, p,
Figure 4. (a) Repetition priming effects and (b) direction priming
effects in Experiments 3a and 3b, in the visible (black) and
invisible (gray) condition. Error bars correspond to SEM.
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0.001, despite the decreased size of the probes in
respects to the primes (Figures 5b, c). In addition, we
found that the difference of similarity between related
and nonrelated pairs decreased linearly with the size
ratio (R2¼ 0.998, p , 0.001) (Figure 5d). Our analyses
suggest that the similarity between related and non-
related pairs disappears for a size ratio of 30%,
similarity difference¼ 0.009, t(78)¼0.6, p¼ 0.55. The
same analysis performed on the directionality relations
revealed no similarity difference between related pairs
(0.9735, SD¼ 0.0011) and nonrelated pairs (0.9732, SD
¼ 0.0014), t(38) ¼ 0.74, p ¼ 0.47 (Figures 6a, b). These
similarity measures shed light on the discrepancy we
encountered between Experiments 3a and 3b. It is quite
possible that the repetition priming we found in
Experiment 3a does not reﬂect the encoding of motion
direction but simply a perceptual facilitation at the level
of V1. By contrast, in case adaptors and probes do not
share any similarity at the level of V1 (Experiment 3b),
no such facilitation takes place. The fact that direc-
tionality priming was not observed independently of
stimulus visibility (i.e., with or without CFS) is
surprising and suggests that inferring the direction of
implied motion primes involves high-level post-per-
ceptual processes which are irrelevant to disambiguate
the direction of implied motion probes.
Discussion
While the processing of translational motion (Kau-
nitz et al., 2011; Maruya et al., 2008) and spiral motion
(Kaunitz et al., 2011) under CFS is now well
documented, the case of invisible implied motion
remained thus far uncovered. With a series of
experiments involving measures of directional adapta-
tion and priming, we found that when invisible, the
direction of implied motion did not bias the perception
of subsequent stimuli depicting real motion (Experi-
ments 2a, b) or implied motion (Experiments 3a, b; yet
such a bias was also not found for visible stimuli). We
consider three explanations for our ﬁndings.
Figure 5. Primate V1 filtering model applied to the stimuli used in Experiment 3a. (a) Gabor filters (17 receptive field sizes, four
orientations) applied on the foveated implied motion stimuli (here, a horse running leftward). (b) Matrix of cross-correlation
coefficients between a subset of 40 probes and adaptors implying rightward motion, with a size ratio of 80%. The diagonal of the
matrix shows higher correlation coefficients for repeated versus nonrepeated pairs of adaptors and probes. (c) Histogram of
correlation coefficients for repeated (pink) versus nonrepeated (blue) pairs of adaptors and probes. (d) Difference of correlation
coefficients between repeated versus nonrepeated pairs of adaptors and probes as a function of their size ratios. The dashed line
represents the linear variation between the two factors.
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The ﬁrst explanation is a non-speciﬁc decrease of
signal strength induced by CFS. According to this
hypothesis, the direction of implied motion can be
inferred in the absence of awareness, but directional
adaptation effects are too weak to be detected. This
issue is inherent to the contrastive study of conscious-
ness and is present in several studies reporting negative
ﬁndings under nonconscious processing (e.g., Amihai,
Deouell, & Bentin, 2011; de Zilva, Vu, Newell, &
Pearson, 2013; Kang, Blake, & Woodman, 2011;
Moradi, Koch & Shimojo, 2005). We consider this
explanation unlikely for two reasons. The ﬁrst one is
that invisible implied motion stimuli were found to
induce repetition priming effects, suggesting that their
processing was detectable at a lower level (Experiment
3a). The second one is that CFS has a relatively low
impact on motion processing. In case of real motion,
CFS was found to reduce by half the magnitude of
adaptation effects compared to a visible condition
(Kaunitz et al., 2011; Maruya et al., 2008). Plus, we
recently found that CFS had no impact on the
magnitude of adaptation effects from apparent motion
(Faivre & Koch, 2014). Similarly, crowding was found
to reduce such adaptation effects by only 10%
(Rajimehr et al., 2004). Thus, in case CFS impacted the
processing of implied motion similarly to what was
observed for real or apparent motion, one would expect
an adaptation effect reduced to (at most) half the
magnitude of what we found in the visible condition
(i.e., that is roughly a 18% PSE shift). The possibility
that this effect could be missed due to lack of statistical
power is unlikely, as we also found a null effect when
analyzing the psychometric functions of all participants
grouped together (Experiments 2a, b, c).
The second explanation of our results is that CFS
may have speciﬁcally disrupted the processing of
implied motion, preventing the multiple features
conveying the information of directionality to be
completely analyzed, and integrated into a uniﬁed
percept. Inferring the direction of implied motion is
likely to involve several processing steps at different
levels of the visual pathways. As opposed to motion
streaks that may possibly be detected automatically in
early retinotopic areas (Apthorp et al., 2010), the
segmentation of a ﬁgure from its background and the
encoding of complex information like body posture or
semantic categories are known to involve feedback
neural activity (Lamme, Zipser, & Spekreijse, 2002) and
higher level visual areas (e.g., anterior temporal lobe,
see Jellema & Perrett, 2003; superior temporal sulcus,
see Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000) which may require
activation by visible stimuli (Dehaene, Changeux,
Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; Lamme, 2006). Yet
it has been recently described that CFS decreases visual
activity as early as the primary visual cortex (Yuval-
Greenberg & Heeger, 2013) and potentially disrupts
processing in the ventral visual pathways (Almeida,
Mahon, Nakayama, & Caramazza, 2008; but see
Hesselmann & Malach, 2011). Consequently CFS may
allow for a basic encoding of the implied motion
stimulus but disrupts the subsequent and more complex
steps necessary for the information of directionality to
Figure 6. Primate V1 filtering model applied to the stimuli used in Experiment 3b. (a) Matrix of cross-correlation coefficients between
two distinct subsets of 40 probes and 40 adaptors, with a size ratio of 80%. In each subset, half of the stimuli implied rightward
motion, and the other half leftward motion. (b) Histogram of correlation coefficients for repeated (pink) versus nonrepeated (blue)
pairs of adaptors and probes.
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be inferred (see Lin & He, 2009, for the extent of
nonconscious processing under interocular suppres-
sion).
This potential limit of nonconscious processing of
implied motion is compatible with the priming effects
we found in Experiment 3, which occurred when
adaptors and probes shared the same identity but not
the same direction. The similarity measures we
performed suggest that repetition priming effects may
arise as early as the primary visual cortex. Thus, the
low-level similarity between primes and probes may be
sufﬁcient to explain nonconscious repetition priming,
which challenges previous behavioral studies using it as
an evidence for high-level visual processes in the
absence of awareness (e.g., Barbot & Kouider, 2012;
Faivre et al., 2012; Stein, Peelen, & Sterzer, 2012).
Furthermore, the fact that the amplitude of repetition
priming was higher in visible than invisible conditions
suggests that CFS decreases the coding efﬁciency in
these early visual areas (Yuval-Greenberg & Heeger,
2013). Our analysis suggests that experimentalists
aiming at ruling out low-level confounds during
repetition priming should use adaptors and probes with
a size ratio of 30% or less. In order to generalize our
results and probe the limit of bottom-up processes
during nonconscious processing of implied motion, it
would be relevant to compare different approaches
impeding visual awareness (e.g., visual masking, see
Kouider & Dehaene, 2007; visual crowding, see Faivre
et al., 2012; Faivre & Kouider, 2011; Kouider, Berthet,
& Faivre, 2011, and for a methodological comparison
between visual crowding, visual masking, and contin-
uous ﬂash suppression).
A third possible explanation for our results relates
to the dual origin of adaptation to implied motion. It
has been proposed that directional adaptation effects
arise from bottom-up, automatic shifts in the
perception of the real-motion probes. This view is
supported by the fact that the amplitude of adapta-
tion decreases when a brief delay is inserted between
the adaptor and the probe and is not correlated with
participants’ prior knowledge of the implied motion
phenomenon (Winawer et al., 2008). However, it
remains possible that directional adaptation effects
also require top-down strategic processes that do not
take place in the absence of awareness (see Kiefer,
2007, for a review). Electroencephalography showed
that the response latency in the occipital lobe is ;
100 ms longer following exposure to implied versus
real motion, consistent with a feedback projection
following extended perceptual processing in high-level
brain areas (Lorteije et al., 2006). Within the dual-
stream visual processing framework (Milner &
Goodale, 1993, 2008), implied motion may involve
ﬁrst posture-dependent neurons in the ventral visual
pathway, which in turn activate motion sensitive
neurons in the dorsal visual pathway (Giese &
Poggio, 2003). Along this line, it has been shown that
imagery of motion induces directional adaptation
effects on real-motion probes, suggesting that top-
down processes in the absence of sensory stimulation
can exert speciﬁc inﬂuence on sensory neurons
(Winawer, Huk, & Boroditsky, 2010). Furthermore, a
recent study found evidence for cross-modal adapta-
tion effects, in which motion implied in the auditory
modality by ascending or descending scales produced
a motion aftereffect in the visual modality (Hedger,
Nusbaum, Lescop, Wallisch, & Hoeckner, 2013).
Top-down inﬂuences may decrease over time, which
would account for the negative correlation between
adaptation and stimulus onset asynchrony, and be
completely implicit, which would explain why previ-
ous knowledge of the implied motion phenomenon is
not a predictor of the effect amplitude (Winawer et
al., 2008). The fact that we did not ﬁnd any
directional adaptation effects with simple arrow
adaptors argues in favor of top-down limitation,
rather than a limit in visual processing under CFS
(see Experiment 2c). It is of note that the bottom-up
and top-down reasons mentioned above are not
mutually exclusive. Whether the absence of adapta-
tion to invisible implied motion arises from limita-
tions in the bottom-up encoding of the stimulus, top-
down post-perceptual processes, or a combination of
the two, our results are in contrast to the ability of
the visual system to detect high-level semantic
incongruities within natural yet perceptual invisible
scenes (Mudrik et al., 2011; Mudrik & Koch, 2013).
This suggests that different limits of processing and
perceptual integration apply to different visual
signals. Although natural scenes depicting implied
motion or semantic incongruities are relevant to
study spatial integration, deciphering the low-level
mechanisms at play with and without awareness may
beneﬁt from the use of simpler stimuli, such as Gabor
plaids, in which on Gabor patch with vertical motion
superimposed to another one with horizontal motion
is perceived as an integrated oblique drift (e.g.,
Adelson & Movshon, 1982). To conclude, while the
theoretical framework relating awareness to infor-
mation integration is appealing (Tononi, 2008), one
still has to investigate the continuum of integrative
capacities and its link with perceptual awareness. The
goal is to deﬁne the criteria about which types of
integration require and which do not require aware-
ness. As those criteria are likely to be numerous and
complex, we believe that measures comparing sys-
tematically different classes of sensory signals under
different methods preventing perceptual awareness
are required.
Keywords: awareness, consciousness, implied motion,
continuous ﬂash suppression, priming
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